It is often argued in economics that building a reputation for trustworthiness could help individuals or firms to mitigate or even overcome problems of contractual incompleteness. In this paper, we use data from the German eBay website to test whether a seller's bad reputation has an effect on selling prices. For auctions of popular DVDs at eBay we do indeed find evidence for this hypothesis. We show that an increase in the share of negative ratings of one percentage point decreases the selling price by about 4 per cent. The number of negative ratings, in contrast, does not affect the selling price significantly. Hence, bidders on the eBay marketplace seem to concentrate on relative rather than on absolute measures of reputation. Further, we challenge the recommendation that it is profitable for eBay sellers to let their auction end in the evening, when many potential buyers are supposed to be online. We find that prices are relatively lower in the evening. This may be due to a much higher supply of DVDs in the evening.
Introduction
From an economic viewpoint, the decision of whether to go to court and try to enforce a claim legally is simply a question of cost versus benefit. In some markets, the costs are too high so that people forgo a legal enforcement of their claims. Imagine such a market and suppose additionally that the products sold are of varying quality and the quality of an item is ex ante, i.e. at the time of sale, unobservable to potential buyers. As argued by Akerlof (1970) , in such a market the following scenario may arise: Sellers of low-quality products claim their products are of high quality since, after the transaction, they are unlikely to be sued by buyers. Anticipating this, a buyer's willingness to pay for a product decreases. This induces sellers of high-quality products to withdraw their products from the market. This entails a further decrease in the willingness to pay for a product, which again induces some sellers to leave the market, and so on. In the end, only the sellers of products of the lowest quality find it worthwhile to stay in the market.
Reputation is said to mitigate or even overcome such problems. If a seller offers a product that matches the quality promised, buyers update their belief that the seller is trust-In spite of the convincing chain of argument, empirical evidence of reputation effects has until recently been relatively rare since reputation was hard to quantify. This is no longer the case for electronic markets, such as eBay, that make extensive use of feedback systems to keep track of individuals' trading behaviours. The main problem in these markets is the anonymity of trading partners. Often, partners act under nicknames and not under their real names. This has two serious consequences for the functioning of the market. First, sellers can never be totally certain of receiving payment for the item sold.
1 Second, and worse still, buyers face the risk of not receiving the product at all (or in lower quality) after having paid for it. One potential solution to these problems is the use of feedback systems.
Recently, electronic markets have attracted researchers who analyze reputation and its effects in internet auctions.
2 Although particularly for the eBay website there now exist a lot of studies, the results are not unambiguous (see Table 1 ). While most studies indicate that a good reputation leads to higher bids and, hence, higher selling prices, Eaton (2002), Cabral and Hortascu (2004) as well as Jin and Kato (2002) find no such effects. The aim of the current study is thus to further contribute to this literature and to help develop a better understanding of reputation effects in auctions. By analyzing more than 300 auctions of new DVDs that took place in November and December 2005 on the German eBay website www.ebay.de, the current study complements the existing literature in two ways. First, we take into account both the number of negative reports in previous auctions as well as the percentage of negative feedback, i.e. the ratio of the number of negative to total ratings. This is different from most previous studies that concentrate on absolute numbers of positive and negative ratings.
3 Second, we analyze reputation effects for products that are relatively low-priced (as compared to the items analyzed by others). Ba and Pavlou (2002) have shown that reputation effects are stronger for high-price products. By focusing on cheaper products, we offer a relatively stronger test of the relevance of reputation in markets.
Note that sellers are typically second movers and do not send the product before being paid. Still, they suffer from not receiving the payment since they then have to restart the auction. See Bajari/Hortascu (2004) for a review of the existing literature. Exceptions are Cabral/Hortascu (2004) and Livingston (2005) who examine the effect of the fraction of non-positive ratings on selling prices, and McDonald/Slawson (2002) who consider the ratio of negative to positive ratings as a reputation measure. We find that the absolute number of negative ratings has no significant effect on the selling price regardless of whether we control for the absolute number of positive ratings. However, the impact of the percentage of negative ratings on selling prices is strong and highly significant. This implies that reputation plays an important role in the eBay marketplace, but the bidders focus more on relative measures of reputation than on absolute ones. Moreover, we find selling prices to be significantly lower in auctions which end in the evening. This is rather surprising as one would expect more potential bidders to be active in the eBay marketplace in the evening, and, accordingly, a higher demand. This is probably what many sellers expect, too. As a consequence, many sellers decide to let their auctions end in the evening hours. In other words, sellers seem to concentrate on the demand side but neglect the supply side of the market. As our data show, the simultaneously larger supply in the evening hours seems to dominate the demand effect so that prices are relatively lower in the evening.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the organization of auctions on www.ebay.de and how the feedback system works. In Section 3, we describe our data and hypotheses, while Section 4 contains the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Auctions on www.ebay.de
In order to become active on www.ebay.de, one first has to complete a registration process, which includes provision of personal information such as name, address and an email account. Further, a nickname has to be chosen. This nickname is a person's identity at eBay. This means that other eBay users do not get to see a person's true identity, but only his/her nickname. For email accounts that do not demand identification of the holder, eBay itself arranges an identification process. In this way, eBay tries to prevent users from providing fake personal information. Moreover, the identification process narrows a person's ability to restart with a clean record after having received negative feedback. Nevertheless, it does not eliminate this possibility, as a user could for instance restart under the name of a relative who is not yet registered with eBay. As a registered user, one can both place items for sale and bid for items. In order to sell an item, one has to create an offer page. It is mandatory in this context to specify an offer name, an offer description, a starting price, the auction's duration, the accepted payment method and the country from which bids are accepted. Further, the offer can be voluntarily enriched by providing a picture of the product or a specification of a mode of dispatch together with the costs entailed. 5 For eBay auctions, it is usually the case that the buyer bears the shipping costs, while the seller pays the fees for using the eBay marketplace. Following a transaction, both buyer and seller can give feedback on their respective trade partner.
6 Feedback consists of a general evaluation, which may be either positive, neutral A different possible explanation for the finding of lower prices in the evening is that bidders are "sniping" (wait with their bid until the very end of the auction, Roth/Ockenfels 2002) more in auctions that end in the evening and that they hence can attend. Sniping in turn may have a negative effect on the price since it increases bidders' flexibility of adjusting their bids during the auction. In the US, eBay sellers are able to enter a (secret) reserve price. If the actual price lies below the reserve price, they are not forced to sell the product. This is not possible in the German eBay market. Note that we describe the feedback system as it has been when the data were gathered. Recently, eBay has changed its feedback system in some respects. For instance, sellers are no longer able to give a neutral or negative evaluation of a buyer.
or negative, and an additional comment. On a seller's offer page, there is a link to every feedback the seller has received. Moreover, eBay provides two numbers summarizing the seller's overall feedback. The first number is the difference between positive and negative feedback, both from unique users. The second number is the percentage of positive ratings, which is even highlighted in bold characters. When examining an offer, these two numbers are hard to miss so each bidder should at least obtain a rough impression of the seller's reliability. Therefore, a dubious reputation can be characterized by a certain percentage of negative ratings.
Neutral and negative feedback are both rare on eBay. It is common practice to provide positive feedback unless a heavy breach of trust has occurred. This means that negative feedback is mainly provided if one party fails to fulfil his commitment (i.e. the buyer refuses to pay or the seller, upon receipt of payment, does not deliver the item), or if the actual condition of the delivered item deviates extremely (e.g. in quality) from its description on the offer page. 7 A negative rating thus represents a strong stigma.
Data and hypotheses
We study the German eBay website and observe auctions of selected popular movies on DVD (Star Wars, Madagascar, Fantastic Four, The War of the Worlds, Kingdom of Heaven, and Batman Begins) from November 14 to December 18 2005. Analyzing DVD auctions has several advantages. First, we choose to include new DVDs only so that product homogeneity is guaranteed. Second, concentrating on six different movies, we can control for "film effects". Finally, reputation effects should be more likely to occur in high-price-product auctions (Ba/Pavlou 2002) . Therefore, the observation of reputation effects in auctions with low selling prices such as DVDs gives even more strength to the argument that reputation is of empirical relevance.
On eBay, buyers always face the risk of not receiving the good after having paid for it. It is reasonable to assume that buyers assess this risk as being lower if the seller has received many positive and only a few negative ratings in the past, i.e. if the seller has a good reputation. A seller with a good reputation should in turn receive higher bids and, at the same time, attract more potential bidders. As both effects work in the same direction, a seller with a good reputation should ceteris paribus receive a higher price for his product than a seller with a bad reputation. This is what we seek to test.
To do so, we have to specify how we measure reputation, as in the eBay marketplace, there exist a lot of different possible reputation measures. A seller's eBay reputation could be represented for example by the number of positive, neutral or negative ratings he has received in previous auctions. Furthermore, any function including one or more of these numbers is a possible reputation measure. Of all possible functions, the difference between positive and negative ratings from unique users as well as the percentage of positive or negative ratings seem to be of particular interest, as these functions are directly available from a seller's offer page.
Yet in the following, we neglect the former reputation measure and restrict attention to the number and the percentage of negative ratings a seller has received in previous auctions. We document these numbers at the end of each auction. The reason why we use the number of negative ratings instead of the difference between positive and negative rat-ings from unique users is that the number of negative ratings on the eBay website is not only available for the total time of membership of a seller, but also for the usually shorter period of the last twelve months. 8 This information on shorter periods may be important if potential buyers play punishment strategies for a limited time, as suggested by Osborne (2004: 429) for instance. According to these strategies, buyers should punish a non-delivering seller by submitting lower bids for a certain amount of time. In this case, negative ratings from some years ago do not affect the seller's current reputation and potential buyers consider primarily the latest ratings.
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Summing up, we test the following three hypotheses on the relation between the selling price and a seller's reputation:
Hypothesis A: The number of negative ratings for the seller in eBay auctions has a negative impact on the selling price.
Hypothesis B: The percentage of negative ratings for the seller in eBay auctions has a negative impact on the selling price.
Hypothesis C: The number and percentage of negative ratings received within the last 12 months have a larger effect on the selling price than do older ratings.
In addition to our proxies for reputation, we record information on selling prices. Possible determinants of these selling prices besides reputation include the duration of the auction, the required postage or the weekday and time when the auction ends. First, the longer an auction lasts, the more likely it is that it will attract a certain consumer's attention. Second, the required postage should lower the selling price because it has to be paid by the buyer on top of the price. Finally, the weekday and time when the auction ends may influence the price as well. Bidders may be particularly active in their leisure time so that demand and selling prices may be highest for auctions ending at the weekend and/or in the evening. Thereby, we assume that bids are not equally distributed during the runtime of the auction, but that many bidders wait until a few minutes or even seconds before the end of the auction.
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In total, 313 DVDs of the mentioned six movies were sold on the German website of eBay during the observation period. We did not take posted offers ("Buy it now") or hybrid auctions into account so we limit the analysis to pure auctions. The mean selling price of about 12 Q differs between the movies from less than 10 Q (Batman Begins) to more than (Star Wars) (see Table 2 ). During the observation period there were only four more auctions that offered one of these movies and did not receive any bid. The respective sellers ask for a starting price of more than 14 Q on average, which is far above the mean sales revenue. Apparently, bidders are deterred by the amount of the starting price in these cases. Note that it would be possible to construct the difference between the positive and negative ratings a seller has received during the last twelve months. However, this number may include several ratings of the same buyers. Note that eBay is allowed to exclude sellers (and buyers) with too many negative evaluations from the market. See Roth/Ockenfels (2002) for empirical evidence and explanations of this phenomenon.
Empirical results
On average, the sellers have had six negative ratings in previous auctions. Given the average number of positive ratings, 1400, the mean percentage of negative ratings does not exceed 0.5 % (see Table 3 ). In spite of the small average percentage of negative ratings, we still observe a range from 0 to 6.7 %. Presumably, sellers with a larger percentage of negative ratings abandon their eBay personality and start to sell under a different name. Sellers can decide whether the auction lasts 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days. Each possibility is used to some extent. Despite the homogeneity of the goods there is considerable dispersion in the requested postage. The number of auctions that end on Saturday or Sunday does not exceed that of other days. However, almost half of the observed auctions end in the evening between 7 and 10 p.m. (see Table 3 ). In order to analyze the effect of reputation on the price in eBay auctions, we regress the number (percentage) of negative ratings as our proxy for reputation together with the control variables x on the log of selling price in a simple OLS approach: The control variables x include movie dummies and a time trend in addition to the characteristics of the auction listed in Table 3 .
As argued before, we expect k to be negative. The unit of observation is the individual auction. We begin by excluding the number of positive ratings as a control variable and find that there is no effect of the number of negative ratings on the selling price (Model 1 of Table 4 ). We then include the number of positive ratings in model 2. The coefficients for the number of positive and negative ratings have the expected signs, but are far from being significant. Accordingly, our absolute reputation measure has no effect on the selling price. This is in line with the findings of Eaton (2002), Cabral and Hortascu (2004) as well as Jin and Kato (2002) , but contradicts the other studies in Table 1 . As mentioned before, the absence of these effects in the current study may be due to the relatively low prices of the goods we have considered.
In contrast, the percentage of negative ratings based on all evaluations is negatively associated with the price. An increase in the share of negative ratings of one percentage point decreases the selling price by about 4 per cent (Model 3). On average, a seller with 1 per cent negative ratings should receive about Q 0.50 more per DVD than a seller with 2 per cent negative ratings. Similar results can be observed for the number and percentage of negative ratings within the last 12 months (Models 4 and 5). Again, we find a significant effect for the percentage, but not for the number of negative ratings. Model 6 shows that the total percentage of negative ratings is an important indicator for bidders' considerations with respect to the trustworthiness of sellers. In contrast, the percentage of negative ratings obtained in the last 12 months has no additional effect.
Taken together, we find support for hypothesis B (percentage of negative ratings affects selling price), but not for hypothesis A (number of negative ratings affects selling price) and C (number and percentage of negative ratings received during the last 12 months have a larger effect on the selling price than older ratings). This means that bidders evaluate a seller's reliability more via the percentage of negative ratings with the result that this measure strongly affects the selling price.
Note in this context that none of our results changes (qualitatively) if we use the difference between positive and negative ratings from unique users instead of the number of negative ratings as a reputation measure. Further, they are of course also robust to the reputation measure "percentage of positive ratings" (instead of the percentage of negative ratings). This means that the difference in positive and negative ratings from unique users has no effect on the selling price, while the percentage of positive ratings has a significant and positive effect.
The results with respect to the other variables indicate that the cost of postage affects sales revenue negatively, which was expected. However, an increase in postage costs by decreases the price by just 5 per cent on average, which means by about 0.6 Q at an average price of 12 Q. Hence, sellers can make money by charging an above-average amount for postage.
11 This result contradicts an implication of the mental accounting approach of Thaler (1985) . His argumentation is based on the value function of prospect theory (Kahneman/Tversky 1979) , which is convex for perceived losses. Under the assumption that several "accounts" are built for different parts of a product's price, bundling of these prices is beneficial for the seller because the perceived loss is smaller than the This result is confirmed by Morwitz et al. (1998) sum of losses in the case of separate prices. In our case, however, it seems to be beneficial for sellers to segregate the total revenue into the two dimensions postage cost and selling price, because potential buyers concentrate on the main price during auctions and neglect the postage fee. Whether the auction ends at the weekend has no significant effect on the price. Also, the duration of auctions has, contrary to our expectations, no effect on the price. Furthermore, we find the same differences in selling prices across the movies as in the descriptive statistics. Finally, we observe the at a first glance surprising result that selling prices are significantly lower in auctions which end in the evening. In fact, a seller receives a price about 5 per cent higher if his auction ends during the daytime. It seems that many sellers expect the opposite. This would explain why the auctions end in the evening hours in most cases. Nearly half of the auctions in our sample end in the evening between 7 and 10 pm. Hence, sellers may not keep in mind the supply side of the market to a sufficient degree. Although page views at eBay may be higher during the evening hours, the simultaneously larger supply dominates the demand effect.
12 One explanation for the lower evening selling prices may be that it is simply more convenient for sellers to post their items in the evening hours because of lower opportunity costs. Another explanation is that this result represents a decision anomaly and we can speak of an eBay evening fal-13
Conclusion
In this study we have used information on more than 300 auctions of new DVDs that took place on www.ebay.de in November and December 2005 to analyze whether there exist reputation effects in internet auctions. There are two main differences between our study and most previous ones. First, we took into account both the number and percenof negative reports in previous auctions. Second, we have analyzed reputation effects for products that are relatively low-priced (compared to the items considered in other studies). Hence, we offer a relatively stronger test of the relevance of reputation in markets. Our findings show that reputation plays an important role in the eBay marketplace. However, bidders do not focus as much on absolute numbers of negative ratings as is argued in many studies. Instead, they attach particular importance to the initial reports (as shown by Livingston 2005) and to the percentage of negative ratings. Our second result is that prices are significantly lower during the evening. During these hours, there is a relatively high supply of DVDs and presumably also a higher demand. The supply effect, however, seems to dominate. Another possible explanation for this result includes that sniping (Roth/Ockenfels 2002) is more prevalent in the evening than during daytime, when many people do not have time to follow the auction online. This result should be considered in future studies. Intertemporal speculators will not be able to arbitrage the price differences away, because they have to pay the postage themselves. However, it would be interesting to explore whether differences in the selling price over the course of the day are relevant for other goods too.
One may also argue that not only should the expected price, but also its variance be important for the sellers, especially if they are risk-averse. However, the variance in prices does not differ significantly in our sample, whether the auction ends during daytime or in the evening. This argument is supported in a model by Zeithammer (2006) , who argues that bidders can benefit from forward-looking strategies that take the supply side of internet markets into account.
